Abstract. A survey on location authentication protocols and spatialtemporal attestation services is presented. Several protocols and services with these objectives have been proposed during the last decade, but still there is a lack of understanding of the security properties they should provide and which security mechanisms are appropriate. We first define the goals and threat model of location authentication protocols, next they are described and analyzed against this model. Also, spatial-temporal attestation services are described and classified depending on their goal and kind of issued evidence.
Introduction
The development of location technologies and the increasing mobility of our communications have allowed the deployment of Location Based Services (LBS). In this context some applications will benefit of authenticating the location of certain entity (location authentication) while others would prefer to obtain an evidence about the spatial-temporal conditions of certain entity or document (spatial-temporal attestation). For example, a service provider may require that in order to grant access to a service, their clients must be located at some specific set of locations, or a shopping center may desire to grant privileges depending on the visiting history to the center. In another context, spatial-temporal attestation services can be used to notarize from where some data is being sent, where some document is signed or where a certain payment is done. Another application is to provide accountability to the tracking of entities or assets. During the last 10 years several location authentication protocols and spatial-temporal attestation services have been proposed. Still there is a lack of understanding of the security properties they should provide and which security mechanisms are appropriate. In this paper these issues are addressed: a comprehensive survey on these protocols and services is presented and at the same time its security is analyzed.
Location authentication protocols

Definitions, assumptions and threat model
The general setting for a location authentication protocol involves a prover (P) and a verifier of the location (V loc ). P is an entity which has some means for being located by a positioning infrastructure P I (see [HB01] for a survey on location systems) and that we assume to have an unique identification p. The verifier V loc is presented with, or presumes beforehand, the purported location of the prover. Then, location authentication is defined as the process whereby one party (V loc ) is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the location of a second party (P ) in a protocol, and that the second party has actually participated in the protocol (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired). A set of locating entities LE, which are part of the positioning infrastructure, may collaborate with V loc to authenticate the prover's location. V loc may be also part of the positioning infrastructure. We define that a location authentication protocol is secure if in all its executions run with an adversary A, V loc accepts the claim that the prover p is in location l at time t iff this statement is true. The goal of an adversary A is that V loc accepts claims on target tuples τ t = (p t , l t , t t ) such that some or several of the elements of the tuple makes the statement 'p t was in location l t at time t t ' false.
We assume that provers are physical devices which know a secret s that allows to prove its identity p to other entities. This secret s is stored in a tamperresistant module such that all the operations that use s are done inside this module and s cannot be leaked. However, the adversary A can manipulate other P 's physical characteristics in order to subvert the protocol. Authenticating P 's location does not provide guarantees about who is the user U that may be controlling it. Although some mechanisms to authenticate the proximity of the user to the device can be used, such as protecting s with some other secret known by the user, we assume that both are bound to each other.
We assume that the adversary A has under his control a set of compromised provers P * ⊂ P where P * = {p * 1 , . . . , p * n }. The adversary can place these compromised provers in any location l ∈ L chosen by the adversary at any time t ∈ T and make them to execute a location authentication protocol with V loc , to communicate securely between them using radio, sound or other mediums, or to capture, intercept or insert any message. Once an execution of a protocol has started, the adversary cannot move the compromised provers arbitrarily at his will if this movement is against the physic laws, but he can force them to not follow the steps of the protocol or to claim a different identity. The adversary can also record executions of the protocol run by provers under his control or by other provers, and use this information in later executions. The adversary may also want to know the whereabouts of provers which are not under his control, that is, A would like to attempt against the privacy of provers p / ∈ P * . We are not going to analyze the protocols against this threat. In the same way, we will not consider denial of service attacks, even when it is very easy to run them successfully in the depicted scenario (e.g. jamming).
A) Initialization.
1. V loc generates uniformly at random k bits αi. 2. P generates uniformly at random k bits mi. B) Commitment.
1. P commits to the k bits mi using a secure commitment scheme protocol. C) Fast exchange. This phase is run repeatedly k times for i = 1 . . . k:
1. V loc starts a timer. 2. V loc → P : αi 3. P → V loc : βi = αi ⊕ mi (immediately after it receives αi) 4. V loc stops the timer and measures the latency time λi. D) Commitment opening.
1. P opens its commitments on bits mi to V loc . E) Authentication and verification.
1. P builds m = α1|β1|...|α k |β k , signs this value m and sends the result to V loc . 2. V loc verifies if the committed bits in step B.1 are the same as αi ⊕ βi. If this holds, V loc computes m as P would have done and verifies P 's signature on m. If this also holds, V loc computes an upper-bound on the distance using the maximum of the measured latency times max(λi) with i = 1, ..., k, and accepts if and only if P is close by. 
Distance-bounding protocols
The goal of these protocols is to authenticate that the prover P is within some distance d lim from some location l 0 where a locating entity LE or a verifier V loc is placed. Without losing generality, the set of locations L t that the adversary may target is defined as
is a function that returns the distance between two locations. Following we describe and analyze the distance-bounding protocols that currently exist in the literature.
Based on fast challenge-response exchanges Some distance-bounding protocols are based on the measurement of the round trip latency λ between P and V loc . They are designed as interactive two-party protocols and the main assumption is that the signals used to transmit the exchanged messages have a constant propagation speed v, where v = v c ∼ = 3 × 10 8 m/s if radio or optical signals are used and v = v s ∼ = 340m/s if sound. The round trip latency is defined as λ = t pp (l 0 , f (P, t run )) + t pc (P ) + t pp (f (P, t run ), l 0 ), where t pp (l 1 , l 2 ) is the propagation time between location l 1 and location l 2 , t pc (A) the processing time of an entity A between the reception of a challenge and the transmission of its response and f (p, t) returns the location of prover p at time t.
Brands and Chaum were the first that proposed a protocol falling in this category in [BC94] (see Figure 1 ). Their protocol and the ones in [ČBH03, Bus04] assume that the device has some hardware that performs the exchange in a fast manner over some dedicated communication channel. Then, they assume that the prover's processing time is negligible compared to the propagation time and an upper-bound of the distance between V loc and P can be computed as
Other proposals in [SSW03,WF03] assume that the device has a non-zero processing delay. Then, the upper-bound is calculated as δ = v × (λ − t pc (P ))/2. In [SSW03], responses are sent using sound while challenges use radio signals, then δ ∼ = v × (λ − t pc (P )).
Assuming that the adversary A controls a single prover p *
. This would be possible if provers are not authenticated at any time during the execution of the protocol. Most of the distance-bounding protocols based on fast exchanges authenticate provers. On the contrary, in the protocol in [SSW03] provers are not authenticated (it is not considered a goal), therefore the impersonation attack does not make any sense. The protocol in [WF03] does not authenticate the prover, but the whole spatial-temporal certification protocol which uses it in a phase does, then preventing this attack.
With a single compromised prover
A may try to decrease the measured latency λ (decreasing measured latency attack) with respect to the one that should have been measured (note that trying to increase λ will not help A to get the claim accepted). First, A may try to send the response in advance of receiving the challenge from V loc . To avoid this, the response in this kind of protocols is chosen such as it depends on the challenge and a value which P commits to previously, as in the protocol in Figure 1 . If it can be assumed that the propagation speed of the signals used to exchange the messages has an upper-bound which no prover, including those controlled by A, can exceed, then the probability for A guessing a response r ∈ {0, 1} m , and succeeding in the attack, is 1/2 m . To increase the security of the protocol, several exchanges can be done. In the case of the proposal in [SSW03] the previous assumption does not hold, because the response is transmitted using sound. Then A may try to decrease λ by using a faster signal in some part of the trajectory.
In protocols in [SSW03,WF03] a non-zero processing time is assumed, then A may try to decrease measured latency λ by decreasing this time. To avoid this, in [WF03] it is proposed that this time is known by the verifiers and it is assumed that A cannot manipulate it. On the contrary, in [SSW03] it is assumed that A may tamper this time; an effective countermeasure is proposed based on decreasing d lim dynamically depending on the declared processing time
If A controls a single prover p * i , he may try the attack referred as mafia fraud in [BC94, Bus04] 
The protocols in [BC94,WF03,ČBH03,Bus04] prevent this attack as the distance between p k and p * i makes λ increase and V loc will not accept the claim (assuming that the propagation speed has an upper-bound which cannot be exceeded). The protocol in [SSW03] would prevent this attack if A could not use signals which propagate faster than sound, but this is not assumed in the protocol. Anyhow, as in [SSW03] anyone can impersonate other provers, the proxy attack does not make any sense.
When the adversary controls at least two provers p * i and p * j , which is a reasonable scenario, then the attack referred as collaborator attack in [BC94] or terrorist attack in [Bus04] can take place. Then the target tuple
If the fast exchange phase is not bound to the identity of the entity who executes the protocol, it can be done by a different one. For example, in protocol in Figure 1 p * j may sit between p * i and V loc and act as a transparent proxy between them in all the phases except in the Phase
→ P : P, N 4. P → V loc : P, R, N 5. V loc verifies that the token N received in step 4 is the same as the one it sent to LE in step 2. The proposal in [Bus04] solves this problem by binding the secret s to the fast exchange phase. In Bussard's protocol the response depends also on s in such a way that this dependency can be proved without revealing it by using proof of knowledge protocols. This protocol is secure (with some probability) if it can be assumed that the signals' speed has an upper-bound that cannot be exceeded.
Based on token broadcast Other distance-bounding protocols are based on broadcasting some token N through a set of short-range beacons playing the role of LE. Protocols proposed in [KZ01b, Mic03] are of this kind. In this setting it is assumed that the token can only be received if d(l 0 , f (p, t run )) < d lim , d lim determining the end of LE's transmission range. Then, knowing N is assumed to be a proof of having been close to LE. As Kindberg and Zhang discuss in [KZ01b] this assumption can be reasonably held in certain scenarios (e.g., if infrared or ultrasound signals are used and the region is delimited with walls).
If the adversary controls a single prover p *
he may try to guess N (guessing attack). To prevent this attack, tokens should be random nonces, and at the same time should depend on the area and the broadcast time to prevent reuse attacks. Protocols in [KZ01b,Mic03] prevent these attacks.
As in the previous setting, A may try to perform impersonation attacks, to prevent this attack, some kind of prover authentication is needed. However, protocols falling in this category do not agree with this approach. Protocol in [Mic03] does not authenticate provers during execution (one of its main goals is prover anonymity). Kindberg and Zhang in [KZ01b] claim that entity authentication or anonymity issues are orthogonal to the location authentication problem, and therefore they do not consider this issue in their protocols (see protocol in Figure  2) . As in our model impersonation attacks are relevant, prover authentication should be required.
Proxy attacks may also be run in this setting. In a first version A will target a tuple
i sits between p k and V loc , acting as a transparent proxy between them and playing the role of V loc to p k . The protocol in [Mic03] is vulnerable to this attack as it does not authenticate provers. Protocol in [KZ01b] could prevent this attack if V loc authenticated provers and kept a registry binding broadcast tokens with specific prover requests, or if this binding were done within the token and its authenticity preserved (assuming that honest provers would not accept tokens not addressed to them). A second version of the proxy attack is that one where the prover p * i sits between LE and p k , acting again as a transparent rely between them. A targets the tuple
This attack would not be detected even if tokens were bound to provers in an authentic manner. A possible countermeasure suggested in [KZ01b] is that V loc measures the response time to verify if it corresponds to the expected distance between V loc and p k ; then similar techniques to the ones presented in the previous section will be applied. Another countermeasure might be that LE used unforgeable RFID schemes and that tokens were bound to each detected prover.
If A controls at least two provers p * i and p * j then collaborator attacks may take place. Target tuple would be
All the considerations made before for proxy attacks are relevant, but in this case p * j will collaborate in the attack (e.g. accepting tokens not addressed to it). Again, a possible countermeasure would be that LE authenticated provers in the acceptance area and that tokens were bound to them.
Absolute positioning protocols
The goal of these protocols is to authenticate P 's absolute position with some resolution. These protocols usually rely on triangulation techniques. If the target prover is
Following the two kind of protocols falling in this category are described.
Based on simultaneous fast challenge-response exchanges As these protocols are designed as the simultaneous execution of several distance-bounding protocols based on fast exchanges run by P and several LE, then, the analysis presented in the previous section for distance-bounding protocols based on fast exchanges can be applied to this setting. Given this, let's assume that A controls one single prover p * i , that the speed of the exchanged signals cannot be exceeded by any prover and that some countermeasures have been applied to prevent manipulation of processing times if devices are assumed to have any. Then A may try to prove being in another location l t = l * i by delaying prover's answers. Capkun and Hubaux prove in [ČH04] that if the prover lies within the triangle with vertices each LE, it cannot prove successfully being at another location than where it actually is. A prover can always prove to be further from one of the LE but then, if it lies within the mentioned triangle, it must prove to be closer to at least other of the LE, which is not possible under the assumptions.
Based on authenticated ranging Some location authentication protocols are based on signals broadcast by global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as GPS. In these systems several satellites orbiting around the earth transmit continuously signals L i ; satellites play the role of LE. The positioning principle is based on measuring the time of flight from a satellite LE i to the prover P , which allows to compute their range or distance; several ranges can be used to calculate P 's absolute position by triangulation. This method needs that satellite and receiver clocks are synchronized, but usually there exists some bias or offset in the receiver clock respect to system time (satellite clocks are much more stable and precise); therefore to calculate the prover's position (latitude, longitude, height) the bias must be solved and at least four measurements are needed. In this section it is assumed that provers are GNSS receivers with added functionalities such as communication capabilities.
A first approach to authenticate P 's location at time t would be that the device calculated its position f (p, t) using the received navigation signals and sent a spatial-temporal report containing the tuple (p, f (p, t), t) to V loc . If these reports are not protected, A can intercept them and send faked ones instead (report manipulation attack). To avoid this, message authentication should be provided as it is suggested in [GW99, PWK04] .
Even if reports were authenticated, A might try to manipulate provers in order to transmit false reports (device manipulation attack). If A controls one prover p * i located in l * i at time t * i , he may force p * i to send forged reports
(if reports can be sent at a later time t j > t * i ) or a combination of these. To avoid this threat in [PWK04] it is proposed to use tamper resistant receivers such that they only output authenticated spatial-temporal reports calculated with received navigation signals, and which can check its integrity status and send reports on it.
Anyway, even if these assumptions can be held, A does not need to tamper provers to make them generate false reports. This is possible because satellite signals can be easily synthesized or manipulated with the appropriate software and fed to the device (signal manipulation attack). Anyhow, the price of these simulators or its hiring is high and in several applications it may not be worth compared to the benefit that A may obtain. To avoid these attacks the authentication of the broadcast signals should be guaranteed. One approach is to use symmetric encryption, as in one of the GPS signals where spreading code encryption with a symmetric secret key is used. Other approach considers that satellites broadcast some unpredictable information which would be recorded by P and forwarded to V loc . This approach is somehow used in [MMZ + 97] , where small errors such as satellite orbit errors and ionospheric errors are used as unpredictable information. However, Kuhn points out in [Kuh04] that with this mechanism anyone who were able to verify the correction of the unpredictable information could also spoof the signal by including this information on a synthesized signal or transforming the signal according to it; further research should be done to check if this kind of attack could be detected in this case. A last approach to provide authentication to broadcast signals is based on asymmetric cryptography. For example, the proposal by Kuhn in [Kuh04] uses digital signatures to provide protection against signal synthesis attacks and also selective delay attacks; in this case undetectable hidden markers are inserted in the signal at unpredictable times and, after some time, signed information that allows markers verification is broadcast.
A may try to run in this setting both variants of proxy attacks. The first version (where l * i = l t ) is not possible in [PWK04] as devices are assumed to output authenticated reports, but the second version of the attack would make the device to calculate a wrong position unless it could detect that the signals had been forwarded. In [MMZ + 97] the first version of the attack might be prevented if latency measurements or similar countermeasures were carried out, because reports are apparently not bound to a specific receiver. The second version of the attack would not easily succeed as devices must prove to be at a fixed set of positions, the forwarding of the signals and its feeding to the device will make V loc to fail in the calculation of its position with a high probability. This last situation would happen also in [MMZ + 97] if A tried to carry out a collaborator attack, which would not be possible in [PWK04] as trusted devices are assumed.
Spatial-temporal attestation services
Similar to the definition for non-repudiation services in [ISO97] , we define spatialtemporal attestation services as those services that generate, collect, maintain, make available and validate evidences concerning either the spatial-temporal conditions of an entity either of the spatial-temporal conditions under which a transformation or action is made by some entity on certain data. A trusted third party (TTP), the spatial-temporal evidence generator (G e ), is in charge of generating the evidences, and probably also collects, maintains and makes them available. Another TTP may exist, the spatial-temporal evidence verifier (V e ), if the evidences cannot be verified by any party by itself. We assume that the generator of the evidence G e , before certifying the spatial-temporal conditions of the subject of the evidence, delegates the verification of these conditions to some entity V loc , which should execute a location authentication protocol.
Assuming that spatial-temporal attestation services rely on secure location authentication protocols, the goal of a spatial-temporal attestation service is to provide unforgeable, non-transferable and verifiable spatial-temporal evidences on tuples τ = (p, l, t) such that it is true that the subject p was in location l at time t. The goal of an adversary A is to obtain evidences on tuples τ t = (p t , l t , t t ) such that some or several of the elements of the tuple makes the statement 'p t was in location l t at time t t ' not true.
Following, a classification of spatial-temporal attestation services is presented depending on their specific goal and which kind of evidence they issue. Most of the spatial-temporal attestation services existing in the literature use well known evidence generation mechanisms such as digital signatures, secure seals or authenticator tokens. Therefore, a security analysis as the one developed in Section 2 is not presented in this case.
Spatial-temporal certification services. A first kind of spatial-temporal attestation services are those that have as main goal to provide evidences on the spatial-temporal conditions of a subject. A first group between these services provide evidences that may be certificate-like or credential-like. The proposals in [ZKK01,WF03] fall within the certificate-like category while the one proposed in [Bus04] can be classified as credential-like.
Other authors in [GTRR03] suggest to link certificate-like spatial-temporal evidences, as it is done in linked time-stamps schemes, to provide accountability to the temporal order of the evidences. Some of the protocols presented in [ČBH03] also provide some kind of spatial-temporal evidence but the location is not explicitly included in the evidence, they are more like temporal authenticators of the encounters between entities than proper spatial-temporal evidences.
A second group between spatial-temporal certification services provides ticketlike evidences or short-term credentials, such as the protocol in [Mic03] . Another protocol that falls into this approach is presented in [NNT03] , but in this case the ticket, which is more similar to an authenticator than to a proper credential, can be used only a limited number of times.
Spatial-temporal stamping services. A second kind of spatial-temporal attestation services are those that have as main goal to provide evidences about the spatial-temporal conditions under which some document exist or a transformation is made by some subject on this document. In this case, G e issues spatial-temporal stamps, which bind the document or its transformation with the spatial-temporal conditions. One of the more interesting transformations is to sign some data, which can be useful for example if some payment is done or some contract or attestation is signed. The only proposals that really fall under this approach are the ones presented in [KZ01a, LSBP03] .
Conclusions and open issues
The expectations raised by recently proposed location authentication protocols and spatial-temporal attestation services are very promising. Although several protocols and services with these objectives have been proposed in the last decade, there is a lack of a framework that comprises them and that helps to analyze its security. In this paper we have surveyed existing location authentication protocols and spatial-temporal attestation services, their goals have been stated and its security has been analyzed against a proposed threat model.
There are still some open issues that should be further studied such as to analyze the efficiency of the protocols and services, the privacy they provide or how they may defend against denial of service attacks. The results of this work may be applied to analyze the security of the standardized positioning techniques in the context of mobile telephone networks.
